“I've been reading James Dolezal's, All That Is In God and
also listening to John Webster's Heyward lectures on creation. Both agree that
as Webster puts it, "the beginning of creation is no beginning for
God" and brings about no change in him. Dolezal has a chapter explaining
how God is Eternal Creator. Webster emphasises that God is perfect fullness
without creation and that creation was wholly superfluous, and that God was
free not to create. I struggle to see how God can be described as Eternal
Creator and also be free not to create. If the will of God flows inevitably
from the being of God, does that not mean that God is not free in anything, but
had to do all that he has in fact done? Can anyone help with this? Am I
misunderstanding Dolezal's argument?”
There seems to be two questions that we are considering
here. Firstly, was it necessary for God to will to create? Or, to put it in
another way, was God’s decree to create necessary?
Secondly, was Creation itself (i.e. the world) necessary?
Does the world necessarily exist?
On first impression, the two questions appear to be quite
similar. If God decrees to create in His eternity, immutability, aseity, and goodness,
the world must necessarily exist. But was God free to will to create, or was He
compelled to create out of His nature and being? Here, Muller is helpful:
“Aquinas makes a basic distinction between the necessity to
create and the necessity, once the work of creation is viewed as belonging
definitively to the will of God, of creating the world in a certain manner. He
also divides this second necessity into two questions relating to ends and
means. Thus, first, the divine determination to bring the world to its full
realization—the eternal idea which God has in his mind concerning the world—is
a counsel freely formed, an idea freely conceived. The object and end of God’s
willing is his own goodness—the glory of God rests in a sense on his power to
create or not to create. In a derivative sense, however, creation is necessary
even if no necessity is placed on the will of God from without. Since discrete
ideas cannot be separated out of the mind or essence of God—so that the content
of the divine mind is simple and equal to God himself—the eternally free will
to create and the eternally realized idea of the creation must result in the
world itself. For God’s eternal mind and will are immutable: the world must
necessarily exist, but this is a necessity of the consequence or of
supposition, resting upon the divine counsel or decision to create.”[1]
Thus, Aquinas makes a distinction between necessitas consequentis
(i.e. “the necessity to create”) and necessitas consequentiae (i.e. “the
necessity, once the work of creation is viewed as belonging definitively to the
will of God, of creating the world in a certain manner”). Allow me to explain
this with simple propositional logic.
Let us take a proposition that P = I will work tomorrow. And
allow us to consider a simple conditional sentence with the form “If P, then
P”. A sentence with this structure is true by virtue of its logical form. If I
will work tomorrow, then I will work tomorrow. This logical form of the
sentence is then necessarily true since it is logically true for every case of
that P. Hence, it is necessary that, if I will work tomorrow, then I will work
tomorrow.
To put it succinctly:
Necessarily (If P, then P)
or
(1) Nec (P-->P).
In (1), only the implication between the antecedent and consequent
is necessary (also called implicative necessity). Both the antecedent and
consequent can be contingent and not necessary. This implicative necessity is
also known as the necessitas consequentiae (the necessity of the consequence).
For those who remember their lessons in conditional sentences for Greek grammar:
if the protasis is true, then the apodosis is guaranteed by means of
implicative necessity. But both the protasis and apodosis can be contingent and
not necessary.
The necessitas consequentis (the necessity of the consequent)
can be written as:
(2) If P-->Nec P.
In this case, the consequent itself (or apodosis) is
necessary. If I will work tomorrow, it is then necessary that I will work
tomorrow – which is not true!
(1) does not imply (2), nor does (2) follow from (1). Even
if I will work tomorrow, it is a contingent event and not logically
necessitated. Confusing (1) and (2) is to confuse necessitas consequentiae with
necessitas consequentis, what logicians would call a modal fallacy.
Taking this understanding and applying it to our topic at
hand, we have the following propositions to consider.
(3) It is necessary that: If God wills to create, then God wills to create.
The antecedent, which Muller states as the “divine
determination to bring the world to its full realization” is contingent in the
sense that it “is a counsel freely formed, an idea freely conceived.” Muller
continues to explain that, “there is in any will a certain necessity and a
certain freedom. Aquinas looks to the analogy of the human will. Certain things
are willed necessarily or governed by the nature and the end, the goal, of the
person—yet the person freely chooses the means by which he effects that end.
This argument also applies to God: for in the act of creation God necessarily
wills his own absolute goodness as the end or goal of all his willing. Yet God
freely chooses, without any necessity, the means by which he will communicate
his goodness to creation. He freely chooses those things and means which lie
outside of his nature and refer to the contingent order of nature.”[2]
To elucidate this further, what Aquinas is saying is that the
end or goal of the things willed (Creation, for example) is necessarily
governed by God’s nature, “for in the act of creation God necessarily wills his
own absolute goodness as the end or goal of all his willing.” Yet God freely
chooses the means by which His goodness is communicated to His creation. With
His “eternally free will to create,” “the object and end of God’s willing is
his own goodness—the glory of God rests in a sense on his power to create or
not to create.”[3]
Proposition (4) is, however, not true where:
(4) If God wills to create, then it is necessary that God
wills to create.
Remembering that no necessity is placed upon God’s will from
without, God’s necessity to create is correctly termed as a necessity of the
consequence “insofar as, de potentia
ordinata, God has bound himself to the counsel of his will.”[4]
God in His eternity, immutability, aseity and perfection decrees to create. God’s
willing to create was not necessary in a logical sense, that is, God was not
compelled out of a logical necessity to create. It is instead a necessity of
the consequence (necessitas consequentiae), or as how the Reformed Scholastics
would put it, conditional necessity.
Now to answer the question, “Was Creation of the world
necessary? Does the world necessarily exist?” Creation itself is necessary “in
the derivative sense” as Muller aptly puts it, and therefore is a necessitas consequentiae
by virtue of God’s decree and will. “For God’s eternal mind and will are
immutable: the world must necessarily exist, but this is a necessity of the
consequence or of supposition, resting upon the divine counsel or decision to
create.”[5]
Again, “there is no necessity that God decree what he
decrees; but, granting the divine decree, God is bound to his own plan and
promises. Therefore, the fulfillment of the divine plan and the divine promises
is necessary, but by a necessitas consequentiae.”[6]
It is also important to note that, in creating, God
contingently wills all that is contingent. His will to create is directed ad
extra onto contingent objects (e.g. time, space, and matter), and hence, His
creation is the contingent manifestation of His divine will and does not
emanate from His being or substance. So Creation is not necessary in the sense
that God is necessary – a necessary being and the First Cause (necessitas
absoluta), but is a necessity of the consequence of God’s decree to create.
Van Asselt writes, “If the decision of the divine will is
directed to contingent objects ad extra, then God’s will is contingent, too. In
other words, God contingently wills all that is contingent. Created reality,
therefore, is the contingent manifestation of divine freedom and does not
necessarily emanate from God’s essence. For if this were the case, all things
would coincide fundamentally with God’s essence, and the actual world would be
an eternal world and the only one possible world.”[7]
References
[1] Richard
A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of
Reformed Orthodoxy; Volume 3: The Divine
Essence and Attributes (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003), 59–60.
[2] Ibid., 60.
[3] Ibid., 59.
[4] Ibid., 60.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Richard
A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms : Drawn Principally
from Protestant Scholastic Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House,
1985), 200.
[7] Willem
J. van Asselt, “‘The Abutment against Which the Bridge of All Later Protestant
Theology Leans’: Scholasticism and Today,” in Introduction to Reformed
Scholasticism, ed. Joel R. Beeke and Jay T. Collier, trans. Albert Gootjes,
Reformed Historical-Theological Studies (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage
Books, 2011), 199.
3 comments:
Further Questions from a brother:
1. Is God's will distinct from His being? (If God is whatever He has, as the doctrine of simplicity teaches ["all that is in God is God"], is He His will? If so, then how can we speak of a necessity flowing from His will over against an absolute necessity from from His nature?
2. Re: "Though some have argued (I think rightly) that creation is fitting to the divine essence," is non-creation also fitting to the divine essence? If creating and not creating are equally fitting to the divine essence, then the statement "creation is fitting to the divine essence" does not seem meaningful. If creation is more fitting to the divine essence that non-creation, then could it be said that God could just have easily willed the less fitting state of affairs? This does not seem like a statement we would want to make.
Brother, those are really good questions, and I would be keen to read Prof’s answers to them. If you would, do allow me to attempt to give you my 2 cents worth.
I think Prof Barcellos statement that, “If creation were necessary to the divine essence, it would be the divine essence, for that which is necessary to the divine essence is necessary for the divine to be,” answered the inquiry through via remotionis/negativa, i.e. for God to be God, His creation cannot be God.
Concerning God’s freedom: I am not a voluntarist, so I believe that God cannot lie, God cannot create a square circle, and that He cannot call evil good or good evil (i.e. logical and moral contradictions). As God is the first efficient cause (FEC), nothing could have contributed to His willing apart from Himself. As a FEC, God has to be “a se,” pure actuality, eternal, timeless, simple, immutable, and impassible (following Aquinas’ arguments in Summa Contra Gentiles). Also, if we affirm divine simplicity, His being is His will.
Counterfactuals of creaturely freedom only apply to contingent beings with creaturely freedom. As God is an equivocal cause of creatures, our freedom is different in nature from His. Hence when we speak of God as “freely” willing to create, His divine freedom can only be understood analogically at best, we being complex creatures. As I see it, although God acts according to His nature, it does not follow that His being/nature logically/morally necessitates His decree to create as there are counterfactuals of God's free activity. In modal logic we distinguish between necessity and possibility. If something – say P – is necessary (logically necessary), then it is not possible that not-P. If it is possible that P, then it is not necessary that P. There is neither a logical nor moral necessity (pace Liebniz), in lieu of His nature, to create or not to create. It is then possible that God did not create.
Our language cannot express accurately things belonging to His divine simplicity since our language entails complexity as it is part of His creation. However we can, through via negativa and via remotionis, determine that which cannot be predicated of God (by the way, since God is simple, nothing can be properly predicated of God! God simply is). Ultimately, I would relegate these answers to mystery, for we would surely fail to comprehend His Being as He is ultimately incomprehensible.
But for certain, if God necessarily has to create in order to demonstrate His glory, His glory then is in some manner dependent on His creation, and He is no longer God the FEC.
There is a critique of this post from a budding theistic mutualist at http://puritanreformed.blogspot.com/2019/04/revisiting-issue-of-eternal-creator.html
He fails to grasp the modal fallacy, and implied that Classical Theists have no choice but to concede panentheism, that is, if creation were necessary for God, then God is dependent upon His creation. If creation were necessary to the divine essence, it would be the divine essence, for that which is necessary to the divine essence is necessary for the divine to be. God will cease to be God. He is now a part of creation, which is necessarily His being.
Nevertheless, Chew writes:
“Indeed, God's decree and God's will is necessary. But it is a necessary decree and a willing of contingent things. In other words, we must say that creation is not necessary, but becomes necessary in light of God's willing and decree. Note the language of "becoming" here, which is a process not a state. Since creation becomes necessary in light of God's eternal decree, God cannot be called the eternal Creator, but rather that He becomes the Creator, from eternity in light of the decree to be sure, yet still not an eternal Creator. This "becoming" does not make God mutable, because the title "Creator" is a role of God working ad extra, not ad intra.”
The writer doesn’t seem to be aware of what he is writing about.
For God to become (“becoming”) something He wasn’t before is to attribute predication concerning His being. It is an ontological predication.
In Thomistic terminology, it is an essential or substantial “becoming,” not merely accidental (by the way, God being simple has no accident!). He writes, “God cannot be called the eternal Creator, but rather that He becomes the Creator.” Here, the writer states that God “becomes the Creator,” and then insists that it is a “working” of God ad extra. He exclaims with gusto, “This "becoming" does not make God mutable.”
But for God “to be” or “to become” via “a process” of becoming – for Him to become something He wasn’t – is an ontological predication. It is a change in His being, therefore an assignation and attribution of mutability concerning His being and ontology.
God is simply “to be.” He is not “becoming.” He simply IS.
The writer continues, “Just like God becomes my personal Savior only when I trusted in Christ in time, yet He remains immutable, thus the ad extra works of God do not change Him in any way.”
And no, oh no. God doesn’t “become” your Saviour. He is your eternal Saviour by virtue of His eternal decree to redeem you. Although you believed in time, He didn’t “become” a “Saviour of Chew” in time. Furthermore, He didn’t amass predications upon Himself in time by being the “Saviour of X,” “Saviour of Y,” etc ad infinitum ad nauseam. God the Father chose from all eternity past, in His eternal and unchangeable decrees, to save some people. God the Son, from all eternity past, agreed to redeem those people from the fallen state that God ordained, from all eternity past, they would be in.
What is more amusing is that the writer takes my reasoning that creation is a necessitas consequentiae (the necessity of the consequence), and reiterates it in his critique of my article. He writes, “In other words, we must say that creation is not necessary, but becomes necessary in light of God's willing and decree.”
Yeah right. Creation “becomes necessary in light of God's willing and decree.” Thus, this is the ideal “solution” for a theistic mutualist – a “solution” stolen from Classical Theists in defence of his mutable God who add accidents ad infinitum to His being.
Update: I have met up with brother Daniel Chew as he deemed my label (see above comment) of "budding theistic mutualist" an inaccurate representation of his position. To avoid transgressing the ninth commandment, I hereby officially withdraw my allegations based upon the following:
1) He had clarified that despite my understanding of his lengthy reply to this blog post found on his blog, he does not believe that God undergoes any essential/ontological change.
2) He has indicated his interest in explaining his position further, and I gladly await his research into this matter.
3) He is exploring the Eastern Orthodox's essence/energies distinction as an example of those who allow some form of "change" in God without any essential/ontological change.
I shall withhold my comments on this issue for now.
I thank God for the opportunity to clarify this matter with Daniel, and I hope to have further conversations with him again concerning this.
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