Banning Abortion Will Create More Problems? A Brief Logical Analysis.

The following is an informal reply to Dr Phua Dong Haur’s letter in Straits Times forum, “Banning abortion will create more problems (Aug 1).” The original writings of Dr Phua is in italics.

I REFER to Ms Tan Seow Hon's comments in 'Time for Singapore to relook abortion law' (July 24).

I refer to Dr Phua Dong Haur’s letter, “Banning abortion will create more problems (Aug 1).”

Although it is true that some legislation should be examined periodically to assess its current relevance, Ms Tan's arguments as to why we should relook the abortion law is one sided.

Fallacy of poisoning the well. You should show how her argument is “one-sided.” Disagreeing with your point of view does not imply that she is being “one-sided.” Isn’t your emphasis on the mother’s choice (i.e. pro-choice or pro-termination) extremely parochial and one-sided as well? (And the one-sidedness of which I will show in the following paragraphs).

She acknowledged that backstreet abortions are dangerous but stated that this reason does not justify legalising abortion. I would like to point out that the danger of backstreet abortion is one of the central issues in legalising abortion.

The key issue here is whether non-therapeutic abortion “simpliciter” is morally/ethically right or wrong. If non-therapeutic abortion is morally wrong, then both backstreet and “legalized” abortions for non-lifesaving reasons are wrong. This is the key issue which you should address first. Avoiding the relevant ethics of abortion only makes one’s arguments (if any) appear fatuous and misinformed.

Likewise, the danger or existence of backstreet euthanasia doesn’t make euthanasia morally right, right? Do we legalize euthanasia simply because they are patients doing it illegally (and of course, with the adherent or accompanying risks of therapeutic failure and complications)?

Dear Dr Phua, the fallacy you have committed is called the ignoratio elenchi. Your argument (thus far) does not even begin to address the central ethical issue of abortion; you have merely argued for its utilitarian value for the mother alone.

Backstreet abortions are done using dangerous techniques or oral ingestion, and they often result in injuries or death to the woman. If medically supervised abortions are banned or made difficult to access, women who want or need an abortion and are unable to travel overseas to do it, will inadvertently turn to backstreet abortions. The result will be tragic.

Your argument fails even the most simplistic of informal logic; therefore, I will not take the time here to discuss utilitarianism with you.

Your syllogism is as follow:

Form of your argument - If A, Then B.

“If medically supervised abortions are banned or made difficult to access (A), then women will inadvertently turn to backstreet abortions (B).” (If A, then B).

Valid forms include – A, therefore B.

It, however, does not follow that - not A, therefore, not B (a logical fallacy called “denying the antecedent”). That is, it does not follow that the following statement is logically true:

“If medically supervised abortions are not banned or made difficult to access (not A), then women will inadvertently not turn to backstreet abortions (not B).”

While there is evidence to suggest that life begins at conception, and various major religions hold similar views, we cannot justify endangering the life of a woman by forcing her to seek backstreet abortions, just to protect the life of the foetus. Similarly, the life of the foetus needs to be protected.

So is it justified that we deny the “right to life” to a child in order to satisfy the whims of the mother? Your statement begs the question, “Why does the mother want an abortion in the first place? Is the requirement therapeutic in nature i.e. to save the mother’s life” She would not be endangered in any way if she chooses not to have an abortion for whimsical reasons. Also, is non-therapeutic abortion ethical for any reason at all?

What so perplexes me is your apparent duplicity in arguing for the denial of the “right to life” of the child, and in the same breath, claimed that “the life of the fetus needs to be protected.” How so? By dismembering the child via abortive techniques? Indeed, the child needs to be protected from paralogisms originating from illogical minds.

Hence, I would argue that the decision to go for an abortion or not, should be left to the woman and the woman alone. This is because she is the one who has to bear the emotional and physical burden, and responsibility of either the pregnancy or abortion. It is not anyone else's place to decide for her, as long as she is mentally competent to make such a decision.

A non sequitur. If an action is inherently unethical or immoral, then society has the right to administer judgment and the necessary legislation. The autonomy of an individual cannot be divorced from societal considerations.

The “right to life” of a child (or any patient) must always be considered in such ethical debates. In the same vein, the “mental competence” reasoning can be used to justify all forms of voluntary euthanasia – it is, after all, the dying/suffering patient who has to bear the main “emotional and physical burden” of the illness/sufferings.

Autonomy must be subjected to and balanced with the other guiding principles of medical ethics - justice, beneficence and non-maleficence. And one of the responsibilities of being a doctor is to save life, not destroy it. This is basic “non-maleficence” as stated in the Hippocratic Oath, “I will prescribe regimens for the good of my patients according to my ability and my judgment and never do harm to anyone. To please no one will I prescribe a deadly drug nor give advice which may cause his death. Nor will I give a woman a pessary to procure abortion.” I guess the Oath is now only repeated as a lip-service to your alma mater. Besides, most abortions are not performed to save a patient’s life.

In the case of therapeutic abortions, most cases of eclampsia/pre-eclampsia and other life-threatening obstetric conditions occur after 20 weeks of gestation, and medical technology today can maintain the life of most 20 plus weeks old children till maturity. Thus, abortion (i.e. to kill the child) even for most life-threatening obstetric conditions is unnecessary.

The rational approach to the dilemma of abortion is not to disallow women to make their own choice, but to educate the public on proper methods of birth control, and alternative avenues other than abortion in an unwanted pregnancy, for example, adoption.

But what if that choice is unethical and causes harm to the unborn child? Furthermore, two wrongs do not make a right. The failure to practice birth control and the consequential unwanted pregnancy does not make abortion (or more precisely, the killing of the unborn child) morally right. We shouldn’t be correcting a “mistake” (i.e. the unwanted pregnancy) with another “mistake” – that of taking the life of the unborn child.

The approach to reducing abortion rates is in education and not legislation.

A false dilemma. The approach to reducing abortion rates is in education AND legislation (and many other means).

Finally, I would like to add that relooking the abortion law is not the method we should adopt to increase the birth rate. The idea is to make people want to have more children and enjoy having more children.

How does the legalization of abortion enable people to desire or enjoy having more children? Have I misunderstood the fact that it is exactly because such people do not desire or enjoy having that child that they chose to abort him or her (at least in most cases today)?

Making abortion illegal or difficult to access certainly does not increase the desire or enjoyment of having more children.

As an analogy, do you mean that making euthanasia illegal likewise does not increase the desire or enjoyment of taking care of our incapacitated parents? Should we therefore legalize euthanasia such that, whenever the care of our severely handicapped parents becomes an overwhelming burden or torment to our physical or mental health, we can have the option to “abort” them? And this (i.e. legalization of euthanasia) is alleged to increase the desire and enjoyment of taking care of our incapacitated parents?

What about the “right to life” of every human being which you have so conveniently ignored in this discussion?

Non-Existent Objects and Russell’s Theory of Description

Certain philosophers (e.g. Colin McGinn) defend the view that there are non-existent objects. McGinn follows Austrian philosopher, Alexius Meinong, who espoused the doctrine of the non-existent. Beginning with the philosophy of mind, particularly with Brentano’s thesis of intentionality, Meinong worked towards a theory of objects that embraces possible objects (e.g. the golden unicorn), impossible objects (e.g. the round square), and incomplete objects (e.g. something tall). Meinong argued that any subject of a true predicate is an object. So, for Meinong, “the round square is square” is true and meaningful, so there is a round square. These objects, including the round square, are mind-independent, yet are all potential objects of thought.

From the mere fact that a subject term is meaningful, and is featured in true, meaningful sentences, it does not follow that it refers to something. Russell writes:

“It is argued, e.g., by Meinong, that we can speak about ‘the golden mountain’, ‘the round square’, and so on; we can make true propositions of which these are the subjects; hence they must have some kind of logical being, since otherwise the propositions in which they occur would be meaningless. In such theories, it seems to me, there is a failure of that feeling for reality which ought to be preserved even in the most abstract studies. Logic, I should maintain, must no more admit a unicorn than zoology can; for logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology, though with its more abstract and general features. To say that unicorns have an existence in heraldry, or in literature, or in imagination, is a most pitiful and paltry evasion.” Bertrand Russell, “Descriptions” in Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961), 169.

Thus, Russell rejects the view that meaning is reference. For Russell, there is a restricted range of genuine singular terms which serves as referring terms (e.g. the first person pronoun “I”). The meaningful use of these terms, also known as logical proper names, guarantees that they have reference. According to Russell, other grammatical subject terms such as ordinary proper names and definite descriptions, are impostors.

Take for example the definite description (i.e. phrases of the form “the so-and-so”):

(1) The average 18th month old child speaks 10 words.

Grammatically, this is a subject-predicate (of the form “Fa,” where “a” is the subject term and “F” the predicate). Nevertheless, the subject term “the average 18th month old child” is a dummy singular term. That is, its function is not to refer to a particular 18th month old child who speaks exactly 10 words. Here, it is apparent that the grammatical structure and logical structure come apart.

The logical structure of (1) is elucidated by:

(2) The number of words spoken by 18th month old children divided by the number of 18th month old children = 10

Thus, the logical structure of (1) is of the form “a/b = c,” and not “Fa.” (1) is just a simpler and shorter way of expressing (2). The “average 18th month old child,” although grammatically a subject term, is not a genuine referring term. Hence, meaning does not guarantee reference (contra Meinong).

Russell’s theory of description argues that descriptions are merely disguised existential quantifiers. No description, be it definite or indefinite, is a genuine referring term. The grammatical structure of sentences containing descriptions is not their logical structure.

For example, the logical structure of “An A is B” is expressed as ∃x(Ax and Bx), that is, something is both A and B. “The A is B” can likewise be expressed as ∃x(Ax and (y)(if Ay then x = y) and Bx), that is, there is an x which is A, and uniquely so, and x is B. This analysis shows that, although the descriptions appear grammatically in the sentences as Fa, the logical structure reveals that the descriptions only function as existential quantifiers (e.g. “there is”). No object corresponds to “an F” or “the F” in the analysis.

In conclusion, certain terms which appear as referring terms turn out to function logically as quantifiers, and we know that quantifiers are not referring terms. When I tell you that “there is a surgeon in the operating theatre,” I am not referring to any particular surgeon, and what I say is true only if there is indeed a surgeon in the operating theatre. If Tom is in the operating theatre, and he happens to be a surgeon, then what I said is true. But if someone else i.e. Harry is in the operating theatre, and he is likewise a surgeon, then what I said is also true. Therefore, quantified sentences are satisfied, or not, by objects. In contrast, a sentence containing a genuine singular term (i.e. a logical proper name) is made true or false only by the states and doings of the object of reference. How things are with other objects is irrelevant.

A Dialogue on Ethical Issues of Life and Death - Abortion

Brief Review of "A Dialogue on Ethical Issues of Life and Death."

This book is written by Rocco J. Gennaro, an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Indiana State University in Terre Haute. It attempts to approach the applied ethical problems of euthanasia, abortion, animal rights and capital punishment from the varied viewpoints of four fictional characters (Larry, Maria, Mark, and Carol). This approach is a refreshing and accessible method for beginning readers of applied ethics to acquire a “bird’s eye view” of what the key issues actually are.

The first chapter offers an introduction to the common ethical theories relevant to ethics. It discusses ethical egoism, utilitarianism (with the distinction between act and rule-utilitarianism), the Kantian categorical imperative, God’s command theory, and ethical relativism.

The author seems to hold a moderate view on the various ethical issues, but is nevertheless vocal against the religious conservative. Gennaro tries to be fair when evaluating the various positions. His attempt at fairness, however, does not translate to an equal treatment of all views. Although it is understandable that Gennaro has his preferred viewpoint, the reader will appreciate the fact that he does not actively promote a particular position. It would be nice to see a more balanced treatment of the minority positions, no matter how politically unsavory they seem to be.

The ethical issue of abortion gets the most detailed treatment in this book when compared to the other issues. Gennaro is right in stating that the concept of person in ethics is the crux of the problem. This book presents the person as one who has consciousness, reasoning ability, self-motivated or voluntary behavior, the ability to communicate, and self-consciousness. But such a concept of person would easily be repudiated with reductio ad absurdum. For example, some patients with severe dementia, mental retardation, or in a coma would not qualify as “person.” Hence, they do not have the right to life, and the killing of such patients would not tantamount to murder. Surely the law and conscience (and many bioethicists) would not agree with such a conclusion. Gennaro makes the distinction between genetic humans and persons, as well as potential and actual persons. He also briefly addresses the problem of rape and incest, and discusses abortion within the guiding principles of autonomy and beneficence.

From the Christian perspective, it is clear from Scripture that life begins at conception with the zygote (also known as conceptionalism; cf. Psalm 139:13-16, Jer. 1:5). From God’s perspective, the zygote is a person with both body - albeit not fully developed - and soul. From such theological reasoning alone, the Christian reader ought to understand that the right to life begins with conception. Of course, the obvious theological or pastoral dilemma lies in the clinical decision to abort the conceptus in order to save the mother’s life. Even so, as John Frame has rightly commented, “Is it in fact justifiable to kill one human being to save the life of another? This question is one which I cannot now resolve. At any rate, our decision even in such a case must be based on the as­sumption that the child is indeed a human being.” And I, too, will not pretend to have any answers to that clinical dilemma at this moment in time.

In any case, it would be troubling at best to know that a particular Christian doctor has approved of, or even performed, abortion. If abortion is rightly called murder in the eyes of God, then the Christian doctor or mother who has willfully aborted the child cannot escape the judgment of Scripture.

I would advise my Christian friends to get hold of this book, and to familiarize themselves with the common philosophical and secular arguments for and against abortion. Finally, I would like to urge all my Christian colleagues and friends to support relevant bioethical, political and legal decisions that is consistent with their faith in the Bible as the Word of God.

PS: This book is available in the libraries belonging to National Library Board of Singapore.


A Presentation on Abortion at the Various Trimesters of Pregnancy

Abortion Techniques in Singapore, Facts, Stats, and the Suicide Link from seeme4mc

Get Off Your Dead Horse, Moral Arguments a Necessity

Logical Fallacies Rampant in Bioethics Debate on Organ Trading

An essay which was recently published in the Straits Times is an excellent example of such logical fallacies. The article, written by Michelle Tan Su May, is entitled, "Get Off Your High Horse, Moral Arguments a Luxury." As the title insinuates, when it comes to certain dire circumstances in life, we are justified in putting our moral values aside. Worse, such moral or ethical arguments are not even relevant to the bioethical issue at hand. Tan Su May wrote, "Moral arguments are a luxury that healthy people indulge in before misfortune befalls them too." This is one of the most ridiculous statements made in any bioethics debate in organ trading.

The writer's original words are in italics; my comments follow each paragraph of Tan's writings.


Get Off Your High Horse, Moral Arguments a Luxury
by Michelle Tan Su May

(The writer is a businesswoman in her mid-30s. A lawyer by training, she runs a property investment firm and owns an antiques shop. She is married with two children.

This article was first published in The Sunday Times on July 6, 2008.)

I am so sick and tired of hearing people who truly know nothing about the situation debate this issue in a vacuum, in principle, in theory, as a hypothetical ethics essay.

Comments: This is an ethical issue, and moral philosophers have to address the bioethical aspects of organ trading. Morality is about right and wrong. If morality has nothing to do with organ trading, then there is nothing right or wrong about it. Why, then, are you complaining about the status quo? There is nothing right or wrong (amoral) about the status quo then.

I was 14 when my dad's kidneys started to fail. It was the realisation of our worst fears, the culmination of a lifetime of worrying.

Comments: Not to sound too callous, but what has your father’s Chronic Kidney Disease to do with the question, “Is Organ Trading Moral or Immoral?” Aren’t you appealing to pity (argumentum ad misericordiam)?

My whole childhood was filled with fear that my dad would die. Having been a diabetic since he was 20 years old, potential loss of sight, loss of his limbs and subsequent kidney failure were the perennial phantoms that lurked in the shadows of his entire adult life, and thus my whole childhood.

Comments: I sympathize with your childhood fear. Perhaps you could have seen a child counsellor or psychiatrist. But again, what has your “fear” to do with the question at hand, “Is Organ Trading Moral or Immoral?” Could you be attempting to sway public opinion on this issue by appealing to the sympathy of the readers (playing the victimization card)?

His burden of daily injections of insulin, never being able to eat anything sweet and a strictly restricted diet were suddenly compounded by kidney failure. Now, in addition to no sugar, he could not take any salt or water. His daily quota of water was only two tiny shot glasses a day - and these small mouthfuls had to wash down more than 10 pills daily.

Comments: What has your father’s insulin usage, daily dose of secretagogues, and low eGFR to do with the question, “Is Organ Trading Moral or Immoral?”

The simple things that we take so much for granted became unattainable luxuries to him. Drinking, eating, walking without assistance, being able to urinate normally, being able to see your kids finish their O levels or PSLE (my younger brother).

Comments: Argumentum ad misericordiam, again.

He was only 39 at the time. He went on the two types of dialysis available to cleanse his blood of toxins. The first type (peritonial dialysis), which involved having a tube dangling out of a hole cut into his tummy, worked quite well for him but because of his diabetic condition, the hole kept becoming infected. So after a few months, he had to go on the more tedious type - hemodialysis. This involved him being hooked up to a machine daily for up to three hours at a time after having metal tubes the size of knitting needles inserted into his arm.

Comments: Again, for the umpteenth time, what has your father’s dialysis experience to do with the question, “Is Organ Trading Moral or Immoral?”

This did not work for him. So the symptoms of kidney failure returned full force. Constant retching, yellowed eyeballs, constant weakness, the inability to walk without assistance, and the inability to work. He was a Simex trader, and an outgoing man.

Comments: We get the picture. So he was a retching Simex trader with jaundice and uremia. What is the point?

After a few months, we were given the bad news and the worse news. The bad news was that the dialysis was not working for him and he needed a transplant. The worse news: Because he had diabetes as well, he was not eligible to be placed on the Singapore organ waiting list! Without dialysis or a transplant, he would die within months. The doctor was basically delivering the news of a death sentence.

Comments: Do you know the clinical reasons which made him ineligible for waiting list placement?

Fortunately, we were informed that it was possible to find a donor in India and have a transplant operation carried out there. After months of blood tests and groundwork, my dad flew to Mumbai to have the transplant. Despite putting on a brave front, he was terrified that he would not survive the operation. He told me later that he had brought extra money, 'in case I had to come home in a box'. I can only imagine what it feels like to say goodbye to your children at the airport thinking it may be the last time you ever see them.

Comments: An appeal to consequence.

So, getting a new lease of life via organ trading makes organ trading morally right?

The donor was a poor young man with a young family from India. He earned approximately $30,000 for his kidney. He used the money to buy a shop and start a business to support his young family. This young man and my dad gave each other a new lease of life.

Comments: Again, appeal to consequence

So, earning $30,000 morally justifies organ trading, right?

My dad lived for seven years after that transplant. He died aged only 49, but he lived to see my brother turn 20 and to attend my university graduation. Never a day went by that he wasn't grateful for this second chance at life. Seven years is a lifetime when you have faced death and managed to get a second chance. Going through all that has also made me a stronger person today.

Comments: Appeal to emotions. So what has that got to do with the question, “Is Organ Trading Moral or Immoral?” We are not wondering if organ trading brings great dividends, or if organ trading can lend you seven more years to see the kids grow up. Is organ trading moral or immoral?

Madam Lam Yar Ee, in The Straits Times Forum page, said: 'The Health Ministry should discipline Singaporeans who return after participating in organ trading.' I say she should visit the homes of dying people who have no other option before she spouts such nonsense. She should look into the eyes of their loved ones, their young children, and get off her high horse.

Comments: Appeal to emotions; argumentum ad odium.

What “nonsense” are you referring to? What if Madam Lam is promoting that which is moral?

You mean, if we look into the eyes of our loved ones, we will find the impetus to do that which is immoral?

Mr Jeffrey Chan said organ sales are wrong because they are 'exploitation of the poor'. Let me ask him this: If you were told that you could have someone abandon their children for years to come and live in your house and to wash your dirty underwear, to wait on you hand and foot, and to clean up your bedridden relatives' faeces, for up to 16 hours a day at 60 cents an hour, wouldn't you think such a situation sounded inhumane and unacceptable? Yet that is what our foreign domestic workers are forced to accept by coming here to work in Singapore.

Comments: OK. So two wrongs make a right? Does the alleged "exploitation" of the domestic helper justifies your exploitation of the poor in organ trading?

Plus fallacies of fake precision & dicto simpliciter.

You mean all maids clean feces for 16 hours each day? You mean every one who employs a maid employs them to clean feces 16 hours each day? You mean every maid in Singapore is married with children?

Do they like it? No.

Comments: How do you know that? Are you omniscient? Emotional appeal and victimization card.

Do they have a choice? Yes and no. They could stay at home and have nothing to feed their children. Or they could come over here in the hope of a better future eventually for their children. Yes, they are poor. Yes, they are desperate. By the same token, Mr Chan would have to argue that we ban the use of domestic workers because it is also exploitation of the poor.

Comments: False dilemma (false choice).

You sure those maids come to Singapore simply because they have nothing to feed their children with (oh, and how do you know if all of them have children?)?

And how do you know if their children would have a better future in Singapore? Aren't these statements mere bare assertions?

It is time to wake up. The world is unfair, life is unfair. It is unfair that some people can live in good health until their 90s, while others like my father die at 49 or earlier. It is unfair that we get to be surrounded by our children and loved ones, while people like my Indonesian maid (whom we treat as part of our family and pay $500 a month instead of the standard $350) have to leave their kids for years in order to eke out a living in a foreign land so their children won't starve.

Comments: So what has this apparent unfairness to do with the question, “Is Organ Trading Moral or Immoral?”

Inequality is a fact of life. Therefore, the role of a sophisticated society should be to regulate all dealings to ensure that the poor, the unhealthy and the desperate know their rights, and their risks versus their potential returns before they embark on any life-changing decisions. Taking the choice out of their hands in the name of protecting them is paternalistic and patronising. Being poor does not equal being stupid.

Comments: But taking that Hobson’s choice out of their hands is to protect them (the poor) from exploitation by moneyed patients like yourself. Since inequality is a fact of life, all the more we should see to it that distributive justice is upheld. That means that donor kidneys should not come only from the poor.

I wonder, did your kidney matched your father’s MHC complex? Never considered that option, yes?

My stance is: 'Get off your high horse.' Till something terrible happens to you, you don't know what you would do to survive.

Comments: Again, an appeal to consequence. Oh, if something terrible happens to me, it justifies my immoral dealings, whatever that might be.

Life is unfair. Poverty is unfair. Ill health is unfair. But we can do something to alleviate the misfortunes of those who are unlucky by allowing them the freedom of choice to save a life and better their own at the same time.

Comments: You mean we ought to "alleviate the misfortunes" by doing something inherently immoral? That’s fantastic advice from a mother of two. No wonder Singaporean kids are behaving like demons.

Freedom of choice results in human beings maintaining their dignity.

Comments: Dignity in what? In doing something immoral? So you gain your “dignity” by performing immoral acts with your autonomous “free” choice?

The dying man who can buy a little more time, and the poor man who can better his family's life by selling an organ that he will be perfectly healthy without - they can both regain some dignity by entering into such a transaction with their eyes wide open and being well-informed of their rights.

Comments: Finally, how does that answer the question, “Is Organ Trading Moral or Immoral?”

Moral arguments are a luxury that healthy people indulge in before misfortune befalls them too.

Comments: Logical fallacies ad infinitum ad nauseam. This is a scare tactic and argumentum ad metum (appeal to fear).

They are some who choose to do that which is morally right even when “misfortune” befalls them. Your statement reminds me of that doctor who hides at home during the SARS crisis.

By ignoring the morality of one’s actions, one becomes a cancer of society, a tumor that seeks to justify its own evil with pragmatic considerations and financial incentives divorced from ethics, altruism and justice. Surely no civilized society wants to be part of that tumor.

Is Organ Trading Moral or Immoral?

I have recently been actively debating on the Straits Times Online Forum concerning the aforementioned issue. The following are some of my thoughts on this matter. (In view of the parliamentary sitting, I have submitted this letter recently to the Straits Times, and is published online here at ST Online Forum 22nd July 2008)

Why I Oppose Legalisation of Organ Trading

THERE are several reasons why I oppose legalization of organ trading.

a. Commodification in bioethics

First, there is the problem of commodification of humans and their body parts which, as ethicist Paul Ramsey has aptly commented, 'will only erode still more an apprehension that man is a sacredness in the biological order'.

Unlike altruistically motivated donation, the sale of organs with the expectation of financial incentives is to commodify humans as mere objects or things, thereby violating the sanctity, dignity and respect due to humans within the living, biological order.

This point is further elaborated by Dr Thomas George, an orthopaedic surgeon, in the Indian Journal Of Medical Ethics, “On a superficial level it does appear that the sale of human organs benefits both the buyer and the seller. The sale of a kidney undoubtedly provides financial relief to a family in abject poverty. I am sure that many poor individuals in India and other Third World countries will exercise their ‘autonomy’ and ‘consent’ to sell their organs. When we oppose the sale of kidneys, we do so in the full realisation of this fact but also feel that humankind should not be thus degraded. We believe that by equitably distributing wealth and curbing the greed of the industrialised West, it is possible to provide a reasonable standard of living for all. This is not wishful thinking, it is a political agenda. We are aware that in the meantime there is much pain for many. Wishy-washy liberals with their piecemeal reform miss the wood for the trees. They are busy applying a BandAid here and some medicines there, ignoring the basic causes that compel large segments of mankind to live in such degradation.” - George, “Organs for sale, philosophy for hire,” Indian Journal of Medical Ethics 4 (1996)

b. Ontology and metaphysical concerns

In conjunction with the problem of commodification of humans is the ontological question, how should we view human beings within the biological order, and what about the purported sanctity of human life? I suspect that how we value humans (and their bodies), and whether we perceive them as sanctified creations or evolved organic molecules, will somehow determine the way we understand the issue of organ trading.

I am convinced that humans, and particularly human lives, have intrinsic value, and thus should not be degraded by means of their commodification.

c. Victims of circumstances, or recipients of distributive justice?

Ceteris paribus, what would be the main reason for the sale of one's organs? From current statistics and a study of the much-touted Iranian model of organ 'sharing', it seems clear that poverty is the chief motivating factor. I believe that even liberal bioethicists like Janet Richards would agree on this point.

The existence of such financial duress in the procurement of organs as commodities from the poor communities is a travesty of distributive justice. Surely something can be done by the Government to avoid this.

Another question we have to address is, should we ration organ availability by need or ability to pay? This is another key issue in the discussion of organ trading and distributive justice.

d. Social justice for the poor

The argument that money received helps the seller-donor rise above his poverty is gravely flawed. It must be the duty of a civilized society to ensure that none of its citizens is in such a dire state of poverty that the poor have to be reduced to selling themselves piecemeal for survival.

e. A genuine slippery slope which is not a fallacy

If we do permit the sale of body parts piecemeal, what then is the overarching moral or ethical principle which would furnish us with a limit to such organ sales? Hypothetically, if we were to respect the autonomy of organ donors-sellers ad infinitum, should we then permit the sale of a kidney, and subsequently the cornea, a limb, the liver and so on?

In other words, if the commodification of human organs is allowed as an ethical practice in Singapore, what then should be the transcendental moral basis to disallow such a slippery slope in the piecemeal disassembly-cum-commodification of a human being?

In view of these points, I seriously think organ trading must remain an unethical vestige of human exploitation.

PS: These points are open for debate and discussion. A guiding discussion framework which we can use are the four principles espoused by Raanan Gillon - autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. Please let me know your thoughts on this, if any.

Closed for the Final Examinations

Dear friends,

As I am too busy studying for the exams at the moment, my blog will be officially closed until further notice. I do not want to post merely for the sake of posting. When I have finished my exams, I will return to writing for this blog.

In the meantime, you might want to visit some of these blogs which are on my blogroll:

1) For good articles on eschatology, visit Kim Riddlebarger's blog.
2) For blogs, articles and studies in the area of homosexuality, check out the "Christian" Gay Movement Watch and Robert Gagnon's homepage.
3) For some excellent devotional pieces and great spiritual insights, read the blogs of Pastor Mike Messerli.
4) My friend Isaiah has a new blog here, and Daniel - as usual - has something to say regarding the Purpose Driven Church movement.
5) Last but not least, Pastor Lau has some important articles on Marriage and Divorce.

God bless,
Vincent

Some Tantalizing Tidbits

As I am busy cramming for the examinations, do allow me to post a couple of links to some interesting news and blogs.

The first highlight of the day is none other than the (ir)religious fundamentalist, Richard. Some fundamentalists kill themselves with bombs, fire, and shrapnel. Others, like Richard, sink themselves with poorly thought out arguments and logical fallacies like those in his infamous, The God Delusion. Now who is the one who is truly deluded?

And due to the follies of Richard, the Intelligent Design lobby will have much to thank him for. And of course, the main problem with The God Delusion is this: If Darwinism logically leads to Atheism, then it is likely a pseudo-scientific, religious philosophy and should not be taught in schools due to the constitutional separation of Church and State.

Michael Ruse, a prominent Darwinian philosopher and agnostic based in the US, criticized,

"Suppose it is true - that if you are a Darwinian, then you cannot be a Christian. How then does one answer the creationist who objects to the teaching of Darwinism in schools? If theism cannot be taught in schools (in America) because it violates the separation of church and state, why then should Darwinism be permitted? Perhaps, given the U.S. Constitution, the creationists are right and Darwinism should be excluded." (Michael Ruse, "The God Delusion," ISIS 98 (2007): 814-816)

Ruse concluded, "If Darwinism equals atheism then it can't be taught in US schools because of the constitutional separation of church and state. It gives the creationists a legal case. Dawkins and Dennett are handing these people a major tool."

But the question for us today is this, “Is Richard Dawkins a Fundamentalist?” I’ll let the reader draw his own conclusions after reading this.

Rev David A. Robertson from Dundee (Scotland) commented,

“It is clear that Dawkins is using his post as Charles Simonyi Professor of the Public Understanding of Science not to promote science, but rather his own atheistic materialist philosophy. Using the language he does in his letter does not advance his cause, and indeed makes him sound like a self-important and petulant fundamentalist whose only resort to those who disagree with him is mockery and accusation.”

Truly, it seems that Richard is indeed a religious fanatic and fundamentalist.

There is also an interesting series of blogs on the recent dialogue between Daniel Wallace (Professor of New Testament at Dallas Theological Seminary) and Bart Erhman (Chair of the Department of Religious Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) concerning the "Textual Reliability of the New Testament.”

Apparently, Bart Erhman sold many copies of his “Misquoting Jesus: The Story Behind Who Changed the Bible and Why.” This book attempts to popularize his thesis that orthodox Christians, instead of heterodox-heretics like Marcion, were the ones who corrupted the Scripture with allegedly “orthodox” emendations. While it would definitely be engaging to listen to the dialogue between these two scholars - one an Evangelical and the other an apostate - I would also recommend the following very accessible book that refutes Erhman’s arguments in Misquoting Jesus - Timothy Paul Jones’ Misquoting Truth: A Guide to the Fallacies of Bart Ehrman’s Misquoting Jesus. This is certainly one book for the layman.

Lastly, here’s a movie you ought to catch - “Expelled: No Intelligence Allowed” by Ben Stein. It's definitely better than watching those Hollywood nonsense.

The international distribution of the show has yet to be announced, and I personally do not know if it would be shown in Singapore.

Kevin gives us a brief description of the movie, “In the documentary Expelled: No Intelligence Allowed, Ben Stein narrates an expose of the narrow mindedness of the scientific elite. It reveals how even some who have barely considered the scientific arguments of Intelligent Design have lost jobs and been effectively excluded from the scientific community. Those who dare to question the sacred fact of Darwinism with profane questions rising out of their work in genetics or math are said to be unscientific.”

It is also interesting to read bestselling author Dinesh D'Souza's scathing critique of Dawkins' part in Stein's movie:

"Is it possible that living cells somehow assembled themselves from nonliving things by chance? The probabilities here are so infinitesimal that they approach zero. Moreover, the earth has been around for some 4.5 billion years and the first traces of life have already been found at some 3.5 billion years ago. This is just what we have discovered: it's quite possible that life existed on earth even earlier. What this means is that, within the scope of evolutionary time, life appeared on earth very quickly after the earth itself was formed. Is it reasonable to posit that a chance combination of atoms and molecules, under those conditions, somehow generated a living thing? Could the random collision of molecules somehow produce a computer?

It is ridiculously implausible to think so. And the absurdity was recognized more than a decade ago by Francis Crick, co-discoverer of the DNA double helix. Yet Crick is a committed atheist. Unwilling to consider the possibility of divine or supernatural creation, Crick suggested that maybe aliens brought life to earth from another planet. And this is precisely the suggestion that Richard Dawkins makes in his response to Ben Stein. Perhaps, he notes, life was delivered to our planet by highly-evolved aliens. Let's call this the "ET" explanation.

Stein brilliantly responds that he had no idea Richard Dawkins believes in intelligent design! And indeed Dawkins does seem to be saying that alien intelligence is responsible for life arriving on earth. What are we to make of this? Basically Dawkins is surrendering on the claim that evolution can account for the origins of life. It can't. The issue now is simply whether a natural intelligence (ET) or a supernatural intelligence (God) created life. Dawkins can't bear the supernatural explanation and so he opts for ET. But doesn't it take as much, or more, faith to believe in extraterrestrial biology majors depositing life on earth than it does to believe in a transcendent creator?"

Machen on Doctrine

Note: My friend Daniel posted some quotations from Machen’s book, Christianity and Liberalism. It is Machen’s words in the second chapter of this remarkable book that inspired this post. The entire book is available online.

In his famous treatise against the false religion of the Liberals, Christianity and Liberalism, Gresham Machen made extensive comments concerning the importance of doctrine in the second chapter. His thoughts concerning the significance of doctrine were weaved into this remarkably clear, concise, scholarly, and yet spiritually rich polemic against one of the greatest heresy of his time.

Some of us had, probably in one way or another, met some zealous young Christians who would be keen to discuss or even have a debate on some nifty, theological points. A few of us from a fundamentalist background might also be familiar with the constant reiterations concerning the importance of doctrine for the Christian life. As familiarity sometimes really does breed contempt, the Christian pilgrim would sometimes be tempted to harbor a certain disdain or even disgust for any such reminders with regard to doctrine. In fact, for some of us, the insistence upon the importance of doctrine is likened to a kind of narrow-minded “Pharisaism.” Worse, some would even associate such an insistence with spiritual immaturity and “carnal” dogmatism.

But why would any Christian create such a false dichotomy between doctrinal precision and spiritual maturity? Regrettably, many church leaders I met have often associated Christian “maturity” with doctrinal broadmindedness and vagueness. Any attempt to spell out the doctrines as taught in the Word of God would be seen as subversive behavior, disrespect for the leadership, or schism. There are, of course, people who are guilty of all or some of the above i.e. subversion, disrespect for church leadership, and/or schism. But to stifle any discussion of doctrine within the church by using the guilt by association fallacy is unbiblical at best. Sadly, isn’t it relatively common to hear the parroting of this comment, “Doctrine is unimportant. Christianity is all about Christian living and service. Let’s not talk about doctrine. Let’s live out our Christianity with Christian service?”

In the second chapter of Christianity and Liberalism, which is entitled “Doctrine,” Machen pointedly states,

“At the outset, we are met with an objection [from the Liberals]. “Teachings,” it is said, “are unimportant ...” But, it will be said, Christianity is a life, not a doctrine. The assertion is often made, and it has an appearance of godliness. But it is radically false, and to detect its falsity one does not even need to be a Christian.” (Gresham Machen, Christianity and Liberalism (NY: Macmillan, 1923), 18-19)

It becomes apparent that the mantra, “doctrine is unimportant,” is not uncommon after all. The liberals used to say it. The postmodernists are currently saying it. But worst of all, evangelical Christians are also mimicking the mantra of the liberals. Is doctrine really unimportant? Ironically, those who pontificate about the unimportance of doctrine are usually the ones who are regarded as being spiritual and godly within the church. The defenders of the faith are perceived as the enemies of the Church, while those who demonstrate a blithe disregard for Christ’s teachings are now welcomed just as Liberals were welcomed into evangelical seminaries all over the world earlier in the last century.

But Machen argues,

“Is it true, then, that Christianity is not a doctrine but a life? The question can be settled only by an examination of the beginnings of Christianity. ... But if any one fact is clear, on the basis of this evidence, it is that the Christian movement at its inception was not just a way of life in the modern sense, but a way of life founded upon a message. It was based, not upon mere feeling, not upon a mere program of work, but upon an account of facts. In other words it was based upon doctrine.” (Christianity and Liberalism, 20-21)

How can it ever be that the Christian life and service should be divorced from solid foundations in biblical doctrines? If the Christian walk and mien is all about appearing nice, compassionate and cheerful, or simply about being broadminded and accommodating, then why shouldn’t we be all initiated into the teachings of Buddhism or Hinduism (or a myriad of other -isms)? Most religions teach their members to be “good,” or to be nice, compassionate, cheerful, broadminded and accommodating. Most religion likewise indoctrinate their believers to follow the moral law, to donate to the poor, to help the helpless, and to be a “cheerful giver.”

So what is the fundamental difference between the religion of Christ, and the religions of the world? We have seen that the outward expression or practice of our religion may in many ways be similar; in reality, there are times when such expressions of piety and charity would be similar to those of another religion. It is therefore the content (propositional truths), or rather, the doctrine of Christ which sets Christianity apart from the other religions of the world. Some might say, “We do not know what doctrine you are talking about, but we know Christ.” My question to them is this, “Which Christ are you talking about?” For in order for us to know the Christ of the Bible, we have to know the teachings concerning Christ which is laid out in the Word of God. Similarly, if we are to practice the Christian religion as taught by Christ and the Apostles, we have to know the doctrines concerning the Christian religion as it is written in the Word of God.

The Word of God exhorts the church elders to hold “fast the faithful word as he hath been taught, that he may be able by sound doctrine both to exhort and to convince the gainsayers (Titus 1:9).” How can the elder “hold fast” the teachings he had been taught, if he was never taught in the first place? How would he convince the “gainsayers,” if he would adopt the attitude of theological “broadmindedness” and postmodern relativity? Such “sayings” by the gainsayer would only be another “breath of fresh air” amidst the theological hodgepodge found within the postmodernist’s viewpoint. But what about tolerance with regard to certain doctrinal differences?

Concerning Paul’s attitude towards doctrine and his tolerance of dissenters, Machen writes,

“Certainly with regard to Paul himself there should be no debate; Paul certainly was not indifferent to doctrine; on the contrary, doctrine was the very basis of his life. His devotion to doctrine did not, it is true, make him incapable of a magnificent tolerance. One notable example of such tolerance is to be found during his imprisonment at Rome, as attested by the Epistle to the Philippians. Apparently certain Christian teachers at Rome had been jealous of Paul's greatness. As long as he had been at liberty they had been obliged to take a secondary place; but now that he was in prison, they seized the supremacy. They sought to raise up affliction for Paul in his bonds; they preached Christ even of envy and strife. In short, the rival preachers made of the preaching of the gospel a means to the gratification of low personal ambition; it seems to have been about as mean a piece of business as could well be conceived. But Paul was not disturbed. "Whether in presence, or in truth," he said, "Christ is preached; and I therein do rejoice, yea, and will rejoice" (Phil. i. 18). The way in which the preaching was being carried on was wrong, but the message itself was true; and Paul was far more interested in the content of the message than in the manner of its presentation. It is impossible to conceive a finer piece of broad-minded tolerance.

But the tolerance of Paul was not indiscriminate. He displayed no tolerance, for example, in Galatia. There, too, there were rival preachers. But Paul had no tolerance for them. "But though we," he said, "or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed" (Gal. i. 8). What is the reason for the difference in the apostle's attitude in the two cases? What is the reason for the broad tolerance in Rome, and the fierce anathemas in Galatia? The answer is perfectly plain. In Rome, Paul was tolerant, because there the content of the message that was being proclaimed by the rival teachers was true; in Galatia he was intolerant, because there the content of the rival message was false. In neither case did personalities have anything to do with Paul's attitude. No doubt the motives of the Judaizers in Galatia were far from pure, and in an incidental way Paul does point out their impurity. But that was not the ground of his opposition. The Judaizers no doubt were morally far from perfect, but Paul's opposition to them would have been exactly the same if they had all been angels from heaven. His opposition was based altogether upon the falsity of their teaching; they were substituting for the one true gospel a false gospel which was no gospel at all. It never occurred to Paul that a gospel might be true for one man and not for another; the blight of pragmatism had never fallen upon his soul. Paul was convinced of the objective truth of the gospel message, and devotion to that truth was the great passion of his life. Christianity for Paul was not only a life, but also a doctrine, and logically the doctrine came first.” (Christianity and Liberalism, 21-23)

Machen continues to elucidate,

“But what was the difference between the teaching of Paul and the teaching of the Judaizers ? What was it that gave rise to the stupendous polemic of the Epistle to the Galatians? To the modern Church the difference would have seemed to be a mere theological subtlety. About many things the Judaizers were in perfect agreement with Paul. ... The difference concerned only the logical--not even, perhaps, the temporal--order of three steps. Paul said that a man (1) first believes on Christ, (2) then is justified before God, (3) then immediately proceeds to keep God's law. The Judaizers said that a man (1) believes on Christ and (2) keeps the law of God the best he can, and then (3) is justified. The difference would seem to modern "practical" Christians to be a highly subtle and intangible matter, hardly worthy of consideration at all in view of the large measure of agreement in the practical realm. What a splendid cleaning up of the Gentile cities it would have been if the Judaizers had succeeded in extending to those cities the observance of the Mosaic law, even including the unfortunate ceremonial observances! Surely Paul ought to have made common cause with teachers who were so nearly in agreement with him; surely he ought to have applied to them the great principle of Christian unity.

As a matter of fact, however, Paul did nothing of the kind; and only because he (and others) did nothing of the kind does the Christian Church exist today. Paul saw very clearly that the differences between the Judaizers and himself was the differences between two entirely distinct types of religion; it was the differences between a religion of merit and a religion of grace.” (Christianity and Liberalism, 23-24)

Let it therefore be known that differences often referred to as “theological subtleties” may seem innocuous enough to the “theological agnostics,” but one such difference might have destroyed Christianity at its inception - the teachings of the Judaizers. The practicers of the religions of Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism may have similar expressions of charity and piety, but it must be remembered that the propositional truths as expounded by these three religions are fundamentally different and contradictory in many areas. It is these differences in doctrine, or rather, the specific teachings of Christ and His Apostles found in the Bible which set Christianity apart from the other religions of the world.

And to him who insists that “doctrine is unimportant,” let him explain why we shouldn’t be followers of the doctrine of Buddha or Brahma if indeed “doctrine is unimportant.”

An Informal Reply to Agagooga Concerning Some Allegations

As fellow blogger Gabriel Seah, or better known as Agagooga, has taken the pains to comment extensively on my previous post, I would like to return him the favor with this very informal reply. Please refer to his comments in the last post (in this post, his comments are in italics).

On a more cordial note, I would like to state that I appreciate Gabriel's input, and I wish him all the best in his studies and vocation.

A. Dan Brown is Sneaky

“Dan Brown's language is very sneaky. As I said, he did not say the EVENTS were true, he said the ORGANIZATIONS etc existed. Please note the distinction.”

This is not true. Dan Brown said, “All of it. The paintings, locations, historical documents, and organizations described in the novel all exist.” “All of it” would include all the allegedly “factual” information in the novel (except the plot/story line). The historical documents, if factual (as he claimed), would have substantial theological implications as well.

“You say that major religions should have special exemptions. How is this different from the double standards you accuse the government of having?”

Again, this is a misrepresentation of what I wrote. I wrote, “The Bible, as well as the Quran and Sanskrit, are the religious texts of various major religions. As a multireligious society, the government cannot ban such religious texts.” The outlawing of religious texts central to worship would be considered religious persecution within a “multi-religious” society. The allowance of freedom of worship would include the legal possession and usage of such religious texts i.e. Quran.

How does allowing “the possession and usage of religious texts” by the various religions in Singapore constitute “double standards?”

B. Jesus and His Alleged Attacks Against Judaism

“Judaism is against humans being divine”

I suppose you mean, “Judaism is against humans claiming to be divine.” Christianity is also against humans claiming to be divine (it’s blasphemy!). Jesus, however, is not merely human. He is God Himself in the flesh. So, is Judaism against God claiming to be divine?

“Judaism preaches the indivisibility of YHWH.”

Indivisibility of what of YHWH? We Christians believe that the Trinity is indivisible as well. (See Thomas Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God (Edinburgh, Scotland: T&T Clark, 1996), 185.)

“Jesus falsely claimed to be a messiah.”

This is another one of your bare assertions. You need to show that he “falsely claimed” to be the Messiah. “Falsely” according to what documents and textual evidence?

“He contradicted the Torah and claimed that its commandments were null and void. One example of a Jewish religious law he transgressed (and urged transgression of) was that of diet - he said you could eat anything, which is blasphemy in Judaism. Another example is his plucking grain, which transgressed the Sabbath. In fact if you're really strict, the punishment for breaking the Sabbath is stoning.”

This is an interesting assertion from you.

Firstly, He did not claim that “its commandments were null and void.” If you insist, you should at least provide us with the relevant exposition and textual evidence. And what historical documents will you use to support your proposition?

If you are arguing from the New Testament, we must make a distinction between narratives of events, and their respective interpretations. Your question impinges upon the issue of hermeneutics. Should we interpret the events the way you did? What is your exegesis of the related texts?

You claim that Jesus “said [they] could eat anything.” You must mean that Jesus encouraged the Jews and His disciples to eat pork and other non-kosher food as well (i.e. everything). Where in the biblical documents (or whatever textual evidence you have) do we find this?

Secondly, we have the question of the Sabbath. Jesus claimed (and Christians agree) that He did not transgress the Sabbath according to the biblical texts. How do you exegete this particular passage to make it say what you want it to say i.e. that He did transgress the Sabbath?

Furthermore, you haven’t answered my question of textual evidence. This is important because: if you want to argue via reductio that based upon the Christian Bible, Jesus did indeed transgressed the Sabbath, the onus is on you to furnish us with that exegetical evidence from the OT and NT.

“I am not assuming the truth of the bible in any way. I am showing that, even on Christianity's terms, what Jesus did was a violation of Jewish law.”

Again, you’re begging the question. How would you interpret the Law in the OT? Why, according to your exegeses, do you think that Jesus transgressed the Law?

According to the biblical documents, Jesus did not violate any “law.” This is the understanding “on Christianity’s terms.” Besides, the law needs to be interpreted before it can be applied.

Finally, concerning your allegation that Jesus “attacked” Judaism, what in your opinion constitutes an “attack?”

Jesus may have taught doctrines that were not palatable to the Judaists, but does that constitute an “attack” on the Judaists? As an analogy, let us consider the Buddhists in Singapore. They are teaching certain doctrines in their sermons that we may find objectionable/heretical as Christians. Some of the Buddhists may even teach/discuss these doctrines in public places. Will you say that the Buddhists have attacked Christians in this regard? Again, if Buddhists do not follow certain Christian practices (and teach their disciples the same), will you claim that the Buddhists have attacked Christianity?

Following your line of reasoning, if the preaching or teaching of doctrines contrary to another religion is considered an "attack," have you considered the option that it was actually the Judaists who "attacked" Christians? The Judaists were preaching and teaching doctrines contrary to Christianity, even heretical doctrines. The Judaists were the ones who oppressed the minority Christians (see the Book of Acts on how Christians were sorely persecuted by the Jewish leaders). And the One who got "attacked" on the Cross was Jesus Christ, not the leaders of Judaism. So should we say that the Judaists persecuted and "attacked" Christ unto death, and not vice versa?

C. Christians shouldn't be offended by the double standards; besides, they persecute others when they get offended

“The degree of offensiveness... is evaluated by the leaders of a particular religion. This is amusing, given that Jewish religious leaders got Jesus crucified.”

I wrote, “The degree of offensiveness of a particular religious publication is not based upon headcount, but is evaluated by the leaders of a particular religion i.e. theologians and pastors who know what is at stake, and what exactly is being said in such literature.”

This statement is made within the context of a tolerant, multi-religious and multi-racial society.

It is amusing for you because you have amusingly made an anachronistic comment outside the Singaporean context (fallacy of abstraction and context-dropping).

“I am also reminded of the Last Temptation of Christ. It was considered offensive by some Christians, but now people realise it made a very pertinent, important and moving theological point.”

What pertinent, important and moving theological point are you referring to, pray tell? Pertinent to who/what, important to who/what, and moving according to who/what? How is that relevant to our discussion here?

The issue at hand concerns apparent double standards by the censorship board with regard to the “Da Vinci Code.”

(Note: In October 2006, our Minister George Yeo said that, “When I was MITA minister, we banned Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses while allowing 'the Last Temptation of Christ' because the Muslim reaction was entirely predictable."

On an earlier occasion (2/06), he said, “In ASEAN, we must not allow similar misunderstandings between Muslims and non-Muslims to surface. When Salman Rushdie's book "Satanic Verses" was published some years ago, Singapore banned it because we knew it would cause trouble. In contrast, we did not ban "The Last Temptation of Christ" because the Christian ground and the Muslim ground are different.”

So it seems that the “Last Temptation of Christ” is not currently banned in Singapore, and this buttress our suspicion of existing double standards.)

“Some Christians wanting to persecute those who allegedly attack their religion: - Corpus Christi got bomb/death threats - The Last Temptation of Christ movie got molotov cocktail-ed in France - http://comment.straitstimes.com/showthread.php?t=10293&page=4#36”

In your previous comment, you wrote, “Christians want to persecute those who (allegedly) attack their religion.” You have failed to show how you know that Christians-simpliciter “want to persecute” such people because they attacked “their religion.” Unless you can argue for causation, your statement qualifies for the honorifics cum hoc, ergo propter hoc and bare assertion.

It is quite feeble that you have to resort to quoting the ST Forum as a source of authority. At best, your aforementioned examples only qualify your allegation as a hasty generalization.

I notice that you have added a modifier – “some” Christians. That makes better sense, but falls for the fallacy of guilt by association. Allow me to explain.

Your allegation = Some Christians want to persecute those who allegedly attack their religion.

But this allegation is true for almost every sect, cult, political association, pugilistic organization and religion, including atheistic and non-religious associations.

So,

P = Some X want to persecute those who allegedly attack their Y.

Where X is a subset of a particular class of people, and Y is the associated ideology/affiliation of this class. There will always be “some” X who would do objectionable deeds apart from the teachings of Y. In this case, the Bible (i.e. Sermon on the Mount) does not teach Christians to “persecute” their enemies.

But what has P to do with the issue at hand? Beside making the whole class of “Christians” or X look bad by associating them with the actions of certain groups of extremists (more accurately, self-professing Christians who do not follow biblical injunctions), how does P support your argument concerning the presence/absence of double standards in Singapore?

That is the point of the entire post.

Couple charged under Sedition Act for evangelism in Singapore

From the Straits Times, dated April 16, 2008

Couple charged under Sedition Act

A COUPLE were yesterday charged with distributing an evangelistic publication that cast Prophet Muhammad in a negative light.

Ong Kian Cheong, 49, and Dorothy Chan Hien Leng, 44, face two charges each - one under the Sedition Act and the other, under the Undesirable Publications Act.

They are alleged to have distributed the evangelistic publication to a Woodlands resident on March 6 last year, and to a Sembawang resident seven months later, on Oct 19.

Ong, who works in a telecommunications company, and his wife, a bank employee, were represented by Mr Selva K. Naidu.

In court yesterday, the police prosecutor sought an adjournment of the case, pending a Health Sciences Authority report on handwriting specimens.

It was not explained in court why this came about.

The couple were freed on a $10,000 bail each, and their passports were impounded.

The case will come up on April 29.

In 2005, a 27-year-old man became the first since 1966 to be jailed under the Sedition Act for posting inflammatory and vicious remarks about Muslims and Malays on the Internet. He was jailed a month. In a connected case, a 25-year-old was given a day's jail and fined $5,000.

Later that year, a 17-year-old blogger was given probation.

The following year, a 21-year-old accounts assistant was given a stern warning for putting up an offensive cartoon of Jesus Christ on his blog.

Under the Act, the maximum penalty is a $5,000 fine and/or a jail term of up to three years.

The maximum penalty under the Undesirable Publications Act is a fine of up to $5,000 and/or a jail term of up to 12 months.

By Elena Chong

A brief note

Within a multireligious and multiracial society, I believe most Singaporeans would agree that the deliberate provocation of religious sentiments via incendiary speeches or related acts should be monitored closely and even condemned by the law. However, the case as presented above is perplexing and very disturbing indeed. It seems that the distribution of “evangelistic publication that cast Prophet Muhammad in a negative light” is a seditious act in Singapore. But what about the distribution of books and movies that cast Jesus - the Lord, Savior, and God of Christians - in a “negative light?”

Apparently, it is not only considered non-seditious to distribute, sell, and promote books in Singapore that cast Jesus “in a negative light,” but also regarded as good entertainment to show movies that promote blasphemous massages concerning the deity of Christ.

Beside the Sedition Act, the Undesirable Publications Act (CAP. 338) “prohibits the importation, distribution and reproduction of undesirable publications.” The only conclusion I can draw at this moment is this: literature that casts “Prophet Muhammad in a negative light” is undesirable and illegal in Singapore, but materials and movies that blaspheme Jesus Christ is not only legal and acceptable, but also considered acceptable public entertainment.

Why are there double standards?

PS: Isaiah, a fellow Christian blogger, has more to say concerning the "seditious" tract. My friend, Daniel, has some comments concerning religious persecution.

A Logical Examination of the Unknowability of God Hypothesis

I have thought of including a logical argument in my previous post to prove the logical failure of the unknowability hypothesis of Neo-Orthodoxy. (1) Nevertheless, due to my tight schedule, I am only able to include the arguments here.

In the current post, I will show that the "unknowability hypothesis" - which is the basic epistemological assumption of Barth - is logically vacuous, and defies the Law of Non-contradiction. We are reminded that any proposition that contravenes the Aristotelian Law cannot be true.

Suppose, for a reductio, we accept the proposition that p = "God is unknowable" is true. In fact, let us agree with the Barthians concerning the unknowability of God that p = "God is X" is true, where X is an attribute of the noumenal God which is unknowable, and therefore, not known and can never be known. We agree, for argument sake, that we are ignorant of some truth concerning God (i.e. that p) which can never be known via Scripture (or by any other means for that matter). And so we suppose that p is true but not known to be true; then (p ∧ ¬Kp) is true.

Therefore, in accordance with the "unknowability of God" hypothesis, Barthians claim that (p ∧ ¬Kp) is true. (2) Furthermore, they know that (p ∧ ¬Kp) is true, that is, ◊K(p ∧ ¬Kp). (3) Now, this is extremely difficult for any logical mind to receive. How can we know that p ∧ ¬Kp? If knowing a conjunction entails knowing the conjuncts, then K(p ∧ ¬Kp) entails Kp and K¬Kp. Now knowledge entails truth (or more accurately, justified true belief), so K¬Kp entails ¬Kp, which is a contradiction for Kp. So, by reductio ad absurdum, it is not possible that K(p ∧ ¬Kp). We have hereby refuted the "unknowability of God" hypothesis of Neo-Orthodoxy.

To further elucidate the problem of the unknowability hypothesis, we understand that the basic premise of Neo-Orthodox epistemology is K(p ∧ ¬Kp). If p = "God is X," and X represents any attribute which is unknowable of God, then the Barthian's denial of the knowledge of X would paradoxically mandate the knowledge of X. Let us say that p = "God is unknowable." We have seen that Barthians insist that p ∧ ¬Kp is true. Knowledge of p ∧ ¬Kp would entail Kp and K¬Kp i.e. knowing that "God is unknowable," and at the same time, knowing that "God is unknowable" is unknowable. This is a contradiction of the Law of Non-contradiction. In other words, if the Barthian claims that they do not know that p, they must also admit that they know that p.

The onus is therefore on those who insist that "God is unknowable" to show that their epistemological presuppositions are logically viable and coherent.

Notes

1. The "Unknowability of God" hypothesis is basically the belief that God, who belongs to the noumena, is unknowable to the mind of man. This must be distinguished from the Reformed understanding of "Finitum non Capax Infiniti," or "the finite is unable to contain the infinite." The Latin phrase should be understood within the context of the Incarnation of Christ. As Frame had aptly commented, "In the incarnation, Calvin argued, God was manifested in human flesh. However, because nothing finite can completely contain the infinite (finitum non capax infiniti), Christ is also active outside the flesh of Jesus. No less than Luther, Calvin insisted that God wills to be known only in Christ. But he did not believe this meant that God is revealed only in the incarnation; Christ, the eternal Word, also operates outside the work of Jesus. Lutheran critics of Calvin's Christology called this the extra calvinisticum." (John Frame, "Incarnation," in The Westminster Handbook of Reformed Theology, ed. Donald K. McKim (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 120.)

2. Where p = "God is X," including the proposition "God is unknowable."

3. For those new to modal logic, the basic unary modal operators are usually written □(or L) for Necessarily and ◊(or M) for Possibly. In modal logic, each can be expressed by the other and negation, that is:

Update:

Re: A clarification for those who are perplexed

I apologize for the use of symbolic logic which may be confusing for some, but it allows some of us to see the picture in a neat, mathematical way.

My point in this post, and the previous one as well, is this: we cannot teach that God is unknowable. Firstly, we cannot know that God is unknowable since this entails a logical contradiction. Secondly, if we do not know that God is unknowable i.e. p ∧ ¬Kp, we should abstain from teaching such a doctrine in theology classes. If you do not know that Tom is unsaved, would you teach others that Tom is unsaved with any certainty?

If God is unknowable (and Barth insists that He cannot be known even through Special Revelation), he has attributes that cannot be known i.e. p = God is X, where X is any unknowable attribute of God. Therefore, with or without the agreement of Barth, if he teaches that "God is unknowable," that proposition can be expressed as p ∧ ¬Kp. Since Barth teaches this in his Church Dogmatics, he must be fairly dogmatic (pun intended) concerning this.

But as we have seen above (in the two posts), to say that God is unknowable (and to say that you know that God is unknowable) is to say ◊K(p ∧ ¬Kp), and this entails Kp and K¬Kp. If you were to look at this expression carefully, you would notice that, to claim knowledge in the proposition that you cannot know p i.e. (K¬Kp), you must also claim Kp. To put this simply, to say that you know that you cannot know that p = God is X, you must paradoxically know that p. But this makes sense. To say, for example, that you know that you cannot know that God is X, you must know what God is X is in order to know that you cannot know that God is X! Contained within the proposition that "you know that you cannot know that God is X" is "God is X," and that logically entails knowledge of "God is X." Because without knowledge of "God is X," we cannot even claim knowledge that "we cannot know that God is X."

But the problem here is: p ∧ ¬Kp is possibly true. Then we can simply say that it is possible that God has certain attributes that we can never know, but we cannot know this for sure (i.e. it is not possible that we know this). In other words, we cannot say that God is unknowable. For surely God is knowable through Scripture, for scriptural revelation is propositional and clear. There may be attributes of God that we do not know and will never know this side of eternity, but we do not know this, and we cannot teach this as part of our theology proper.

To the Unknown God

So Paul, standing in the midst of the Areopagus, said: "Men of Athens, I perceive that in every way you are very religious. For as I passed along and observed the objects of your worship, I found also an altar with this inscription, 'To the unknown god.' What therefore you worship as unknown, this I proclaim to you. (Acts 17:22-23, ESV)

In the Apostle Paul's address to the Areopagites on Mars' Hill, he declared his knowledge of God to them in no uncertain terms. He preached on creation, the sovereignty of God, and the resurrection of the dead. Paul did not entertain their assumption that God is unknown or unknowable. (1) He made known that which is unknown to the Areopagites, namely, the knowledge of the living and true God. But there are some today who would believe that God is unknowable and inconceivable even through Scripture. What therefore they worship as unknown, this I proclaim unto you.

In this post, I shall discuss the erroneous epistemology or the theory of knowledge underlining the theology of men like Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Rudolf Bultmann. Although I do recognize the invaluable contributions by these scholars to contemporary theological thought, I repudiate their epistemological presuppositions as being incompatible with scriptural revelation and human reason. I must, however, be careful to include a caveat: I am by no means a rationalist, a rationalist at least in the following sense - one who believes that God can be salvifically known through human reason and logic alone. But logic and reason are indispensable for man to comprehend God, a God who can be comprehended by the mind of man through Scripture.

Kant’s distinction between phenomena and noumena

According to Immanuel Kant’s epistemology, God cannot be known or conceived by the minds of mere mortals. Kant believes that the mind processes raw data which belongs to the noumena, and such data once processed by the human mind is perceived or conceived as that which belongs to the phenomena. Therefore, what the mind grasps is not the noumenon, but the phenomenon. We humans can never know anything concerning the noumena, because we cannot know anything apart from our mind, and that which is processed by the mind belongs to the phenomena.

One of Kant's salient points seems to be the commendable restraining of our carnal pride when it comes to knowledge. His epistemology would reasonably lead one to remain humble about what we know, and especially what we can never know i.e. knowledge concerning the noumena. What we can conceive and perceive is within the phenomenal realm. The following statement is perhaps a needful, albeit tautologous, reminder: that it is quite impossible to conceive that which cannot be conceived, or to know that which cannot be known.

Kant's epistemology becomes problematic and even self-contradictory when applied to matters of theology (see below). Theologians who adopt a Kantian understanding of the theory of knowledge seem to talk as if we can have beliefs about the noumena, such as beliefs pertaining to the noumenal God and the human soul. If knowledge is justified true belief, and if the mind cannot conceive things belonging to the noumena, we humans cannot have any true beliefs concerning the noumena which is processed by the mind. That which is conceived or conceivable by the mind belongs to the phenomena, and by default excludes the noumena.

Herein lies the crux of the matter: are our epistemic presuppositions leading us to the worship of an "Unknown God?" If God is ontologically unknowable, then He must remain unknown to mere man, and such a God is in essence an "Unknown God" who must remain unknowable.

Kantianism in Barth's Writings

Karl Barth was one such theologian who was influenced by a Kantian epistemology. Although some might argue that this is an unfair caricaturing of Barth’s theology, Barth was adamant that God is, and that He must remain, hidden, unknowable and indescribable to us. God ultimately belongs to the noumenal realm, and whatever knowledge we claim that we have is really of an incomprehensible reality. Such beliefs cannot be knowledge. For Barth, God is a personal God, “but personal in an incomprehensible way, in so far as the conception of his personality surpasses all our views of personality.” (2)

As man cannot know the noumenal God, God must give faith to the believer in order to believe in Him. As Barth had lamented, “There is no way from us to God - not even via negativa not even a via dialectica nor paradoxa. The god who stood at the end of some human way - even of this way - would not be God.” (3) Such a believer then makes a “leap of faith” in order to believe that which is noumenal. But even so, no knowledge is possessed by the mind concerning God. When God reveals Himself to the believer or to whom He gives faith - the “man of faith” - the man “will confess God as the God of majesty and therefore as the God unknown to us.” (4) Whatever little we claim we know of God, more of God we do not and cannot know. He remains hidden; as our mind can only know that which is phenomenal, Man can never know the noumenal God. (5)

Concerning the inconceivability of the “Unknown God,” Barth writes:

1) Even though God reveals Himself to Man, God remains unknown to Man.

“We know that God is He whom we do not know, and that our ignorance is precisely the problem and the source of our knowledge. The Epistle to the Romans is a revelation of the unknown God; God chooses to come to man, not man to God. Even after the revelation man cannot know God, for he is ever the unknown God. In manifesting himself to man he is farther away than before.” (6)

2) The more we think we know God, the more he is unknown to us. God is inconceivable and unknowable.

"The revelation in Jesus, just because it is the revelation of the righteousness of God is at the same time the strongest conceivable veiling and unknowableness of God. In Jesus, God really becomes a mystery, makes himself known as the unknown, speaks as the eternally Silent One." (7)

"When attempts were later made to speak systematically about God and to describe His nature, men became more talkative. They spoke of God's aseity, His being grounded in Himself; they spoke of God's infinity in space and time, and therefore of God's eternity. And men spoke on the other hand of God's holiness and righteousness, mercifulness and patience. We must be clear that whatever we say of God in such human concepts can never be more than an indication of Him; no such concept can really conceive the nature of God. God is inconceivable." (8)

Therefore, even as God reveals Himself to the man of faith, his revelation remains hidden and God remains unknowable. This conclusion is partly due to his dialectical thinking in theology, also known as the "theology of paradox." His method is more accurately that of Kierkegaardian dialectics than Hegelian synthesis, although some of his approaches seem Hegelian in his presentation of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. (9)

Milbank has rightly observed that, “In the case of Karl Barth, a broad acceptance of a post-Kantian understanding of philosophy is turned to neo-orthodox advantage, in that he can insist that natural reason discloses nothing of God and yet that this opens the way to a renewed and, indeed, now more radical recognition that only God discloses God in the contingency of events as acknowledged not by reason but by faith.” (10)

According to Barth, God will always be “known as the unknown.” The mind of man can never know that which is noumenal, and God will remain unknown to Man. Man cannot have knowledge concerning the noumenal God. This God is therefore an “Unknown God.”

The truth is, although the finite mind cannot have a comprehensive knowledge of Him, we can nevertheless have a limited knowledge of God through His perspicuous and propositional revelation in the scriptures. As R. C Sproul has written, “Because God is infinite in his being and eternal, and we are finite and bound by both space and time, our knowledge of him is never comprehensive. We enjoy an apprehensive knowledge of God, but not a comprehensive knowledge.” (11)

Conclusion: A Self-Contradictory Epistemology

It seems clear to us that the statement, "God is unknowable," is inherently contradictory. (12) If God is indeed unknowable to man, how can Barth know that God exists? For a God who is unknowable cannot be known to exist, for his existence cannot be known. It is perhaps apparent that Barth knows for sure that God is a personal being, unknowable and transcendental in nature. For certain, Barth knows that God is unknowable, and a perusal of his Church Dogmatics reveals how much he does know, or claim to know, concerning the noumenal God who is allegedly unknowable.

Concluding this brief overview of Barthian epistemology, I would like to state that every theologian (e.g. Tillich, Niebuhr, Bultmann) who claims that God is unknowable contradicts himself in logic. God is a personal being who has revealed Himself specially in Scripture. He can be known through the writings of the Apostles and the Prophets who were inspired by the Holy Ghost. (2 Tim. 3:16) Furthermore, if Scripture is as authoritative as Barth often says that it is, shouldn't our epistemological presuppositions be derived from Scripture itself?
Although Man's knowledge of God will never be comprehensive and complete in this life, we can use the mental faculties (e.g. logic) that God has endowed upon us to study the Scripture, to know Him, and to love Him.

Notes:

1. A distinction must be made here concerning the "Unknown God" and the "Unknowable God." A God who is unknown may be knowable, but a God that is unknowable must remain unknown.

2. Karl Barth, The Knowledge of God and the Service of God according to the Teaching of the Reformation, Tr. J. L. M. Haire and Ian Henderson (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939), 31.

3. Idem., The Word of God and The Word Of Man, Tr. Douglas Horton (Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1928), 177.

4. Idem., The Knowledge of God, 28.

5. See Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, Tr. Hoskyns (London: Oxford Press, 1933), 91.

6. Ibid., 48.

7. Ibid., 73.

8. Karl Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, Tr. G. T. Thomson (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), 46.

9. See Peter S. Oh, "Complementary Dialectics of Kierkegaard and Barth: Barth's Use of Kierkegaardian Diastasis Reassessed," Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 48 (2007): 497-512. In contrast to Hegelian synthesis, the article contends that the dynamics of the dialectics of Kierkegaard and Barth should be understood in the manner of a complementary synthesis of two opposites (abstract).

10. John Milbank, “Knowledge: The Theological Critique of philosophy in Hamann and Jacobi,” in Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology, eds. John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock and Graham Ward (USA, NY: Routledge), 21.

11. See R. C. Sproul, Grace Unknown: The Heart of Reformed Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: 1997).

12. See Ronald Nash, The Word of God and the Mind of Man (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1992).

PS: To my friends who are Barthians: this is just my point of view which I am free to express, just as you are free to express your own views. Our conscience is not bound by Man, but by the Word of God (which is the Scripture according to my convictions).

Update

I really like this post by Phil Johnson. Furthermore, it was posted only about two days after I've written this one. Isn't the Holy Ghost trying to tell us something?

Concerning Paul's experience on Mars' Hill, Johnson wrote, "It was as if someone [i.e. the apostle Paul] got in the midst of a bunch of academic postmodernists today and declared that the Bible is true. Just imagine an auditorium full of 21st-century university professors wringing their hands about epistemological humility and the dangers of overconfidence and the uncertainty of human knowledge and the subjectivity of all our opinions—and the whole dose of postmodern angst about being sure about anything. And suppose you stood up in front of that group with a Bible and declared, "Here's something you can be rock-solid certain about, because God Himself revealed it as absolute truth."